Lens
Gradual: Broad automation and transformative growth · AGI ~2040
Growth as of

Chile

Latin America · Resource suppliers
$17,995
GDP per capita · 2025 · World Bank
AGI Growth Index
68.6
Post-AGI rate · from 2040 · Gradual
10.9%
vs trend +8.8pp · doubles every 6.7y
Growth in 2035 · Gradual
4.7%
vs trend +2.6pp
Trend, no AI
2.1%
mean 2016–2025
GDP in 2045 vs no-AI path
×2.2
levels, not rates · think in levels first (Moll & Imas 2026)
Average growth 2025–2045
6.1%
ramp included · comparable across scenarios

GDP per capita to 2060, by scenario

0$50k20252030203520402045205020552060Fast AGIGradual AGI
ModestGradualFastdashed = no AI

Constant-rate scenario path; the 2060 endpoint levels are illustrative, not forecasts.

Factor profile

ComputeGeopoliticsDiffusionLanguageBuildCatch-upDemographicsCyberClimate
Chile
Resource suppliers

These economies supply copper, fuels, bauxite, iron ore, uranium and other inputs required for the build-out.

Modeled advantage: The physical build-out creates terms-of-trade gains, including under Fast.
Main exposure: Commodity income produces lasting development only if rents are converted into other productive assets.
Compute & Energy Access2.0
Geopolitical Positioning2.0
AI Diffusion Capacity4.1
Language Inclusion4.2
Physical Build Speed4.6
Catch-up Headroom2.9
Demographics & Migration3.5
Cyber Resilience3.5
Climate & Environmental Resilience4.6

How this economy meets AI

Today’s production, workforce and automation baseline — context for the scenarios, outside the AGI Growth Index.

Production baseResource-led
Workforce structureService-intensive workforce
Work organizationMostly formal
Current automationMedium current exposure

Where output comes from (% of GDP)

Agriculture 20253.5%
Industry 202531.4%
Services 202555.5%

Where people work (% of employment)

Agriculture 20256.1%
Industry 202521.5%
Services 202572.4%

Informal employment

Share of employment 202526.4%

Current automation exposure

Tasks exposed53.5%
Interpretation of these indicators

Production and exports are resource-led. Direct workplace exposure may be limited, while global demand, commodity prices, extraction productivity and ownership of the resulting capital still transmit AI’s effects.

Current automation, not AGI. The Global Automation Atlas measures economically plausible automation in typical workplaces around 2026. It is a useful baseline for where automation can enter today, not a forecast of exposure to gradual or fast AGI. Explore current task exposure in the Global Automation Atlas →

Sources: World Bank WDI; ILOSTAT; Global Automation Atlas (Garg, Crosta & Baier, 2026). The latest available year is shown for each measure; vintages differ, so shares may not sum to 100.

Country brief · simulations, not forecastsDownload the earlier brief (PDF)
This brief is being updated. It was drafted before the atlas’s latest model update, so some of its growth rates, ranks and dates differ from the figures above. Where they differ, the figures above are current.

Where Chile starts

Chile enters the AGI era as a resource supplier — one of the countries that sells the build-out its raw inputs. For Chile that input is copper, which makes up over half of its exports. The archetype usually means thin institutions and little else. Chile is the exception. Its scores stand out among resource suppliers: physical build speed 4.5, climate and environmental resilience 4.6, AI diffusion capacity 4.1, language inclusion 4.3. It leads Latin America on institutions and already hosts real compute, including Google's data center at Quilicura. Its Atacama solar and wind resources are among the world's best. Two gaps stand out. Compute and energy access scores 2, geopolitical positioning also 2, because Chile sits outside the blocs that ration chips. At about $17,995 per person, it is upper-middle-income. Ten-year trend growth is 2% a year.

The three paths

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline; the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the Modest scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Chile would gain a small lift on trend: 2.4% growth a year, 98th of 157. Copper demand would firm, but the rents would look much as they do today. Under Gradual takeoff, growth would build for two decades and reach 14% a year once AGI matures around 2045. That would rank Chile 19th in the world. An economy growing at 14% doubles in a little over five years. The slow ramp gives Chile time to turn copper, clean power and strong institutions into hosted computing and higher-value exports. Under Fast takeoff, growth would reach 20.8% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling every three to four years. Yet Chile's rank would slip to 26th, because a fast world rewards the compute and chip access Chile does not hold. Demand for its copper, though, would be immense. Regulation and politics could slow or redirect any of these paths. How Chileans and their government respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.

How you would know which world you are in

The scenarios look nearly identical until about 2030. In all three, the late 2020s add only fractions of a point to growth. So watch leading indicators, not GDP, and check them live rather than trust any snapshot. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would signal a fast world; a point or two above trend by the mid-2030s, a gradual one; a fade back to trend, a modest one. Chile's own signals would arrive sooner: copper order books and long-term supply contracts from chipmakers and data center builders, hyperscaler commitments beyond Quilicura, and financial close on grid and transmission projects.

If growth goes explosive

Explosive is relative. At 14% growth a year under Gradual, Chile would run far ahead of its region, whose median growth would be about 8%, but well behind a frontier compounding near 20%. Under Fast, 20.8% would still trail a frontier near 39%. By its own 2% history, either path is transformative. At 14%, the economy doubles in a little over five years; a child starting school would finish it in a country more than twice as rich. Copper revenue could become a genuine fiscal engine, and rising wages would draw workers rather than send them abroad, easing regional migration pressure. Here is the honest risk. A commodity boom is not a development strategy. If the copper rents are spent rather than converted into owned compute, skills and infrastructure, they evaporate when the cycle turns, and Chile hosts little of the intelligence its metal helped build. The hedge is to bank and reinvest the windfall while it lasts. Even then, the pace-setter shifts from the mine to the state: environmental permitting through the SEIA system, the grid operator's connection queue, and the courts would all be tested on speed.

What Chile can do now

Three levers follow from the scores. The first is catch-up headroom, at 3. Strong institutions, open trade and the ability to absorb new technology pay off whether or not AGI arrives, so deepening them is a no-regret move. Chile already leads its region here; the task is to protect that lead, not assume it is safe. A cautious government can act on this today and lose nothing if the skeptics are right. The second lever is geopolitical positioning, at 2. Keeping access to capital markets and deepening trusted-partner frameworks is sensible now, and becomes decisive if chips are rationed by bloc. The third is the bet: compute and energy access, also at 2. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under fast takeoff it is Chile's single biggest lever. Closing it means packaging Atacama power, land and fast permits to anchor hyperscale investment, and clearing the grid connection queue. Chile can adapt a peer's playbook: Colombia used competitive renewable-energy auctions to contract gigawatts of new solar and wind at low prices. To see how moving these scores changes Chile's path under each scenario, open the atlas's policy editor.

Use the policy editor to test how different factor scores change Chile’s modeled path. The roadmap builder below can then incorporate those targets into a 1,000-day planning prompt.

Drafted with Claude, Anthropic’s AI model, from the atlas’s data and an editorial template set by the author.

For government planning · compatible with any AI model

Create a 1000-day AGI and growth roadmap prompt

This prompt can be used with Claude, ChatGPT or an open-weight model hosted on your institution’s systems. It includes the atlas material for Chile: the country brief, economic structure, region, archetype and global scenarios. It instructs the model to ask for local information, use existing strategies and the political calendar, and preserve the atlas’s interpretation rules. The prompt is assembled in your browser; the information entered here is not sent elsewhere.

1 · Read the brief  →  2 · Set targets in the policy editor →  3 · Generate and copy the prompt  →  4 · Run it with an approved model, with high reasoning effort and web access where permitted

No score targets included. Set them in the policy editor.

Instructions are generated in the selected language; the data annex remains in English. Translations are machine-drafted, and corrections from native speakers are welcome through the contact links on the start page.