Lens
Gradual: Broad automation and transformative growth · AGI ~2040
Growth as of

Poland

Europe · High-trust diffusers
$28,420
GDP per capita · 2025 · World Bank
AGI Growth Index
64.0
Post-AGI rate · from 2040 · Gradual
10%
vs trend +6.4pp · doubles every 7.3y
Growth in 2035 · Gradual
5.5%
vs trend +1.9pp
Trend, no AI
3.6%
mean 2016–2025
GDP in 2045 vs no-AI path
×1.75
levels, not rates · think in levels first (Moll & Imas 2026)
Average growth 2025–2045
6.5%
ramp included · comparable across scenarios

GDP per capita to 2060, by scenario

0$100k$200k20252030203520402045205020552060Fast AGIGradual AGI
ModestGradualFastdashed = no AI

Constant-rate scenario path; the 2060 endpoint levels are illustrative, not forecasts.

Factor profile

ComputeGeopoliticsDiffusionLanguageBuildCatch-upDemographicsCyberClimate
Poland
High-trust diffusers

High-income, skilled economies with strong AI adoption, including large aging economies whose diffusion scores offset weaker demographics.

Modeled advantage: Their advantage appears during diffusion and accumulates in the years before broad automation.
Main exposure: Most have little frontier capability of their own and depend on alliance access or open-weight models; many also build slowly.
Compute & Energy Access2.5
Geopolitical Positioning3.5
AI Diffusion Capacity4.2
Language Inclusion4.4
Physical Build Speed3.2
Catch-up Headroom2.0
Demographics & Migration1.5
Cyber Resilience4.5
Climate & Environmental Resilience4.1

How this economy meets AI

Today’s production, workforce and automation baseline — context for the scenarios, outside the AGI Growth Index.

Production baseDiversified
Workforce structureIndustrial workforce
Work organizationMostly formal
Current automationMedium current exposure

Where output comes from (% of GDP)

Agriculture 20252.5%
Industry 202525.8%
Services 202559.7%

Where people work (% of employment)

Agriculture 20256.2%
Industry 202530%
Services 202563.8%

Informal employment

Share of employment 202414.5%

Current automation exposure

Tasks exposed54.5%
Interpretation of these indicators

Several parts of the economy could transmit AI’s effects. The pace depends on adoption by firms, connectivity and movement of workers between sectors.

Current automation, not AGI. The Global Automation Atlas measures economically plausible automation in typical workplaces around 2026. It is a useful baseline for where automation can enter today, not a forecast of exposure to gradual or fast AGI. Explore current task exposure in the Global Automation Atlas →

Sources: World Bank WDI; ILOSTAT; Global Automation Atlas (Garg, Crosta & Baier, 2026). The latest available year is shown for each measure; vintages differ, so shares may not sum to 100.

Country brief · simulations, not forecastsDownload the earlier brief (PDF)
This brief is being updated. It was drafted before the atlas’s latest model update, so some of its growth rates, ranks and dates differ from the figures above. Where they differ, the figures above are current.

Where Poland starts

Poland is a high-trust diffuser: rich enough and skilled enough to absorb AI fast, even as its workforce ages. The scores show why. AI diffusion capacity is 4.2, cyber resilience 4.5, and language inclusion 4.1, so Polish is well served by modern models. Climate resilience is 4.1. These are the traits that compound in the diffusion years before full automation arrives. At about $28,400 GDP per person, Poland is among Europe's fastest-growing large economies, with ten-year trend growth of 3.7% a year built on a deep manufacturing base — manufactures are 78% of exports. Its binding constraints sit elsewhere. Compute and energy access scores 2.5, demographics 1.5, and catch-up headroom 1.9. Google runs a cloud region in Warsaw and Microsoft has pledged fresh data center investment, but domestic frontier capacity is thin.

The three paths

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline; the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the Modest scenario, AI stays an ordinary technology. Poland would gain a modest lift to 4% growth a year, 43rd of 157, as diffusion adds a little to an already solid trend. Under Gradual takeoff, growth would climb over two decades and reach 12.4% a year once AGI matures around 2045. That would rank Poland 34th, with its head start in adoption carrying the gains. An economy growing at 12.4% doubles in under six years. Under Fast takeoff, growth would reach 20.4% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling every three to four years, lifting Poland to 28th — six places above its Modest rank. The faster the takeoff, the more Poland's skills and trust convert into growth, even though it owns little frontier capability. Regulation and politics could slow or redirect any of these paths. How Poles and their government respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.

How you would know which world you are in

The three scenarios look nearly identical until about 2030, adding only fractions of a point to growth in the late 2020s. So watch leading indicators, not GDP, and check them live rather than trust any snapshot. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would signal a fast world; a point or two above trend by the mid-2030s a gradual one; a fade back to trend a modest one. Poland's own tells would arrive sooner than GDP: hyperscaler hosting commitments on Polish soil, financial close on the Choczewo nuclear plant, the order books of its software houses, and defense tech contracts on the eastern flank.

If growth goes explosive

Explosive is relative. At 12.4% growth a year under Gradual, Poland would trail the frontier, where the United States compounds at 19.5%. But it would run well ahead of the European median of 10.4% and far beyond its own history. Under Fast, 20.4% growth would still sit below a frontier racing at 39.2%. The economy would double every three to four years, so a child starting school now could finish it in a country several times richer. Manufacturing and IT services could scale together, and rising wages at home would ease the pressure for Poles to emigrate for work. There is a way this leaves Poland worse off. Its access to frontier models rests on alliance inclusion under the US umbrella and on open-weight models staying near the frontier. Compute it rents can be repriced or throttled from abroad, leaving Poland a rule-taker inside another power's chip regime. The hedge is to own more of the stack, power and hosted compute, rather than only rent it. Even then, the pace-setter shifts to the state, testing how fast ministries, the grid operator and permitting offices can approve and connect.

What Poland can do now

Three levers follow from the scores, and two pay off whether or not AGI arrives. The first is catch-up headroom, low at 1.9. Stronger institutions, open trade and better absorptive capacity — education, finance, infrastructure — raise growth in every scenario, so this is a no-regret move. The second is demographics, weakest at 1.5. Higher labor force participation among women and older workers, skilled-migration visas, and human capital that lets workers complement AI all help even in the skeptic's world — a second no-regret lever. The third is the bet. Compute and energy access, at 2.5, carries the most weight and barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under a fast takeoff it becomes Poland's single biggest lever. Closing it means fast-tracking grid connection and new generation, including the planned nuclear plant, and packaging power and land to anchor hyperscale investment. Sweden shows one model: its northern Node Pole cluster drew hyperscale data centers with cheap, reliable power. A cautious government can act on the two no-regret levers today and lose nothing if the skeptics are right. Open the atlas's policy editor to see how moving these scores reshapes Poland's path under each scenario.

Use the policy editor to test how different factor scores change Poland’s modeled path. The roadmap builder below can then incorporate those targets into a 1,000-day planning prompt.

Drafted with Claude, Anthropic’s AI model, from the atlas’s data and an editorial template set by the author.

For government planning · compatible with any AI model

Create a 1000-day AGI and growth roadmap prompt

This prompt can be used with Claude, ChatGPT or an open-weight model hosted on your institution’s systems. It includes the atlas material for Poland: the country brief, economic structure, region, archetype and global scenarios. It instructs the model to ask for local information, use existing strategies and the political calendar, and preserve the atlas’s interpretation rules. The prompt is assembled in your browser; the information entered here is not sent elsewhere.

1 · Read the brief  →  2 · Set targets in the policy editor →  3 · Generate and copy the prompt  →  4 · Run it with an approved model, with high reasoning effort and web access where permitted

No score targets included. Set them in the policy editor.

Instructions are generated in the selected language; the data annex remains in English. Translations are machine-drafted, and corrections from native speakers are welcome through the contact links on the start page.