Russia
GDP per capita to 2060, by scenario
Constant-rate scenario path; the 2060 endpoint levels are illustrative, not forecasts.
Factor profile
Military governments, very weak state capacity, or limited access to the AI supply chain keep these countries from converting AI into growth.
How this economy meets AI
Today’s production, workforce and automation baseline — context for the scenarios, outside the AGI Growth Index.
Where output comes from (% of GDP)
Where people work (% of employment)
Informal employment
Current automation exposure
Production and exports are resource-led. Direct workplace exposure may be limited, while global demand, commodity prices, extraction productivity and ownership of the resulting capital still transmit AI’s effects.
Sources: World Bank WDI; ILOSTAT; Global Automation Atlas (Garg, Crosta & Baier, 2026). The latest available year is shown for each measure; vintages differ, so shares may not sum to 100.
Where Russia starts
Russia enters the AGI era as a high-risk, volatile power: a country with the engineers and energy of a serious AI contender and almost none of the access. Its lowest score tells the story. Geopolitical positioning is 1 out of 5, the floor, because sanctions have cut Russia off from Western capital and the chip supply chain. Compute and energy access scores 1.4 for the same reason. Yet the raw capability is real. Language inclusion is 4.5, AI diffusion capacity 4.2, and Russia runs home-grown models in Yandex's YandexGPT and Sberbank's GigaChat. Climate resilience is 4.8 and build speed 3.9, backed by Rosatom's nuclear fleet and abundant power. The binding limits are hardware, capital and a shrinking, aging population (demographics 1.9). At about $17,500 per person, Russia is upper-middle-income, with ten-year trend growth of 1.5% a year.
The three paths
These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline, and the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the Modest scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Russia would barely move above trend: 1.7% growth a year, 124th of 157. Sanctions and thin capital keep the gains small. Under Gradual takeoff, growth would climb over two decades and reach 8.7% a year once AGI matures around 2045. That would lift Russia to 74th, roughly its region's median pace. Its engineers and power would let it adapt open-weight models even while cut off from the frontier. An economy growing 8.7% a year doubles in about eight years. Under Fast takeoff, growth would reach 13% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling every six years or so, and Russia would climb 17 places to 57th. The surprise is that a fast world rewards Russia's deep pool of technical talent and cheap energy, provided it can source hardware at all. Politics could slow or redirect any of these paths. How Russians and their leaders respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.
How you would know which world you are in
The scenarios look almost identical until about 2030, so watch leading indicators, not GDP, and watch them live. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would signal a fast world; a point or two above trend by the mid-2030s a gradual one; a fade back to trend a modest one. Russia's own signals would arrive sooner than the growth data: the volume of Chinese accelerator chips crossing the border, the scale and pricing of domestic data center builds, and how widely Yandex and Sberbank push their models into banks, ministries and factories.
If growth goes explosive
Explosive is relative. At 13% growth a year, Russia would run ahead of its region's fast-world median of 8%, but far behind a frontier compounding at 39.2%. The gap with the United States and China would widen, not close. Still, the arithmetic at home would be dramatic: the economy doubling every six years, so a child starting school now would finish in a country several times richer. Fuel, at 43% of exports, would matter less as computing, software and services grew. Fast growth would raise labor demand and wages, which could ease the pressure that has pushed skilled Russians abroad since 2022; it would not reverse the demographic decline. There is an honest way this leaves Russia worse off. Its compute would be rented, not owned — Chinese accelerators on Chinese terms, able to be throttled or repriced by decisions made in Beijing. Sovereignty on someone else's hardware is a dependent's version. The hedge is domestic and allied fabrication, however slow. Even then, the pace-setter would shift to the state, testing whether courts, property protections, regional governors and Rosatom's permitting could keep up.
What Russia can do now
Three levers follow from the scores, and one pays off whether or not AGI arrives. Start with the no-regret move: catch-up headroom, low at 1.5. Stronger institutions, rule of law, property rights and absorptive capacity — schools, finance, infrastructure — raise growth in the skeptic's world and every other. A cautious government could act here today and lose nothing. The second lever is geopolitical positioning, at the floor of 1. Access to capital and to chip-supplying partners is worth real growth even under Modest, but for Russia it is hemmed in by sanctions and the war, so the room to move is narrow. The third lever is the bet. Compute and energy access, at 1.4, barely shifts growth if AI stays ordinary, yet under a fast takeoff it becomes Russia's single largest lever. Closing it means turning Rosatom's power and cheap land into data center capacity and securing chips through partners. Russia could adapt a working model from an archetype peer: Ukraine built its Diia platform into a single digital front door for state services, the diffusion base that spreads AI fast. Open the atlas's policy editor to test how moving these scores reshapes Russia's path under each scenario.
Use the policy editor to test how different factor scores change Russia’s modeled path. The roadmap builder below can then incorporate those targets into a 1,000-day planning prompt.
Drafted with Claude, Anthropic’s AI model, from the atlas’s data and an editorial template set by the author.
Create a 1000-day AGI and growth roadmap prompt
This prompt can be used with Claude, ChatGPT or an open-weight model hosted on your institution’s systems. It includes the atlas material for Russia: the country brief, economic structure, region, archetype and global scenarios. It instructs the model to ask for local information, use existing strategies and the political calendar, and preserve the atlas’s interpretation rules. The prompt is assembled in your browser; the information entered here is not sent elsewhere.
1 · Read the brief → 2 · Set targets in the policy editor → 3 · Generate and copy the prompt → 4 · Run it with an approved model, with high reasoning effort and web access where permitted
Instructions are generated in the selected language; the data annex remains in English. Translations are machine-drafted, and corrections from native speakers are welcome through the contact links on the start page.