Taiwan
GDP per capita to 2060, by scenario
Constant-rate scenario path; the 2060 endpoint levels are illustrative, not forecasts.
Factor profile
These countries supply difficult-to-replace inputs, including fabrication, memory, equipment, materials and lithography.
How this economy meets AI
Today’s production, workforce and automation baseline — context for the scenarios, outside the AGI Growth Index.
Where output comes from (% of GDP)
Where people work (% of employment)
Informal employment
Current automation exposure
Production is relatively manufacturing-intensive. Near-term effects depend on machinery, robotics, supply chains, energy and firms’ capacity to reorganize production, as well as on language models.
This country is not covered by the Global Automation Atlas’s public country file; its task-level exposure work for other countries is at automationatlas.org.
Sources: World Bank WDI; ILOSTAT; Global Automation Atlas (Garg, Crosta & Baier, 2026). The latest available year is shown for each measure; vintages differ, so shares may not sum to 100.
Where Taiwan starts
Taiwan is a supply chain chokepoint: the world's single largest concentration of chip fabrication, and with it a concentration of risk. The scores show both sides. AI diffusion capacity is 4.6 and language inclusion 4.2, so Taiwan can absorb and use frontier tools fast. Geopolitical positioning scores 4, a measure of how central it is to every chip strategy. TSMC's fabs at Hsinchu, Tainan and beyond make the island indispensable. What is missing sits under that strength. Compute and energy access scores 2.8, because Taiwan imports almost all its fuel and its grid is stretched. Demographics score 1.7 and catch-up headroom 1.2, since the population is aging and the economy already sits near the frontier. Ten-year trend growth is 3% a year, at about $33,900 per person (IMF figures).
The three paths
These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline; the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the Modest scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Taiwan would gain a small lift: 3.3% growth a year, 64th of 157. Its chip exports would keep paying the bills, but nothing transformative would follow. Under Gradual takeoff, growth would climb for two decades and reach 12.8% a year once AGI matures around 2045. That would place Taiwan 31st in the world. An economy growing at 12.8% doubles in under six years. The long ramp gives Taiwan time to turn fabrication into a stake in the AI systems its chips run. Under Fast takeoff, growth would reach 22.5% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling every three to four years. Taiwan's rank would rise to 21st, up ten places, because a fast world rewards the exact inputs it controls. Politics could slow or redirect any of these paths. How Taiwanese citizens and their government respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.
How you would know which world you are in
The scenarios look almost the same until about 2030, so watch leading indicators rather than GDP, and watch them live. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would signal a fast world. A point or two above trend by the mid-2030s would signal a gradual one. A fade back to trend would signal a modest one. Taiwan's own signals would arrive first in its order books: TSMC's advanced-node capacity expansions, the size of hyperscaler and AI chip orders, and how fast Taipower can connect new power for chip and data center demand.
If growth goes explosive
Explosive is relative. At 12.8% growth a year, Taiwan would still trail the frontier, because the United States would compound near 19.5% under the same gradual takeoff. But Taiwan would run well ahead of its own 3% history, matching the fastest economies in its region. The economy would double in under six years, so a worker in her thirties today could reach retirement several times richer. Chip fabrication would stay the core, with AI services and design layered on top. Taiwan is aging, with no wave of emigrants to call home; faster growth would instead raise labor demand and wages, which could draw skilled workers in. There is a way this leaves Taiwan worse off. Being the chokepoint is its power and its exposure. A fast world raises the value of its fabs, and with it the incentive for others to control or coerce that capacity. The hedge is to deepen alliances and climb into the AI systems its chips enable, not just the silicon. Even then, the pace-setter would shift to the state, testing whether Taipower, permitting offices and courts can supply power and approvals fast enough.
What Taiwan can do now
Three levers follow from the scores, and two pay off whether or not AGI arrives. The first is demographics, low at 1.7. Taiwan's population is aging and its birth rate among the world's lowest. Skilled-migration visas, higher participation by women and older workers, and human capital that lets people work alongside AI help under every scenario, so this is a no-regret move. The second is absorptive capacity, the catch-up factor at 1.2: keep institutions strong and stay open to trade, investment and technology transfer. That too pays off regardless. Taiwan's real strength, AI diffusion at 4.6, is worth protecting rather than rebuilding. The third lever is the bet. Compute and energy access, at 2.8, barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under a fast takeoff it becomes Taiwan's biggest lever. That means fast-tracking grid connections and new generation, and offering power-and-land packages for data centers. South Korea shows a model: it is building the Yongin semiconductor mega-cluster with dedicated power and pre-zoned land. A cautious government can act on the two no-regret levers today and lose nothing if the skeptics are right. Open the atlas's policy editor to see how moving these scores reshapes Taiwan's path under each scenario.
Use the policy editor to test how different factor scores change Taiwan’s modeled path. The roadmap builder below can then incorporate those targets into a 1,000-day planning prompt.
Drafted with Claude, Anthropic’s AI model, from the atlas’s data and an editorial template set by the author.
Create a 1000-day AGI and growth roadmap prompt
This prompt can be used with Claude, ChatGPT or an open-weight model hosted on your institution’s systems. It includes the atlas material for Taiwan: the country brief, economic structure, region, archetype and global scenarios. It instructs the model to ask for local information, use existing strategies and the political calendar, and preserve the atlas’s interpretation rules. The prompt is assembled in your browser; the information entered here is not sent elsewhere.
1 · Read the brief → 2 · Set targets in the policy editor → 3 · Generate and copy the prompt → 4 · Run it with an approved model, with high reasoning effort and web access where permitted
Instructions are generated in the selected language; the data annex remains in English. Translations are machine-drafted, and corrections from native speakers are welcome through the contact links on the start page.