Lens
Gradual: Broad automation and transformative growth · AGI ~2040
Growth as of

Ukraine

Europe · High-risk / volatile
$5,866
GDP per capita · 2025 · World Bank
AGI Growth Index
48.9
Post-AGI rate · from 2040 · Gradual
3%
vs trend +3.7pp · doubles every 23.4y
Growth in 2035 · Gradual
0.4%
vs trend +1.1pp
Trend, no AI
-0.7%
mean 2016–2025
GDP in 2045 vs no-AI path
×1.41
levels, not rates · think in levels first (Moll & Imas 2026)
Average growth 2025–2045
1%
ramp included · comparable across scenarios

GDP per capita to 2060, by scenario

0$10k$20k20252030203520402045205020552060Fast AGIGradual AGI
ModestGradualFastdashed = no AI

Constant-rate scenario path; the 2060 endpoint levels are illustrative, not forecasts.

Factor profile

ComputeGeopoliticsDiffusionLanguageBuildCatch-upDemographicsCyberClimate
Ukraine
High-risk / volatile

Military governments, very weak state capacity, or limited access to the AI supply chain keep these countries from converting AI into growth.

Modeled advantage: They receive the smallest gains under all three scenarios.
Main exposure: Sanctions, conflict, coups, weak institutions and limited compute access.
Compute & Energy Access1.2
Geopolitical Positioning1.0
AI Diffusion Capacity3.2
Language Inclusion3.4
Physical Build Speed1.9
Catch-up Headroom2.8
Demographics & Migration1.5
Cyber Resilience3.9
Climate & Environmental Resilience4.3

How this economy meets AI

Today’s production, workforce and automation baseline — context for the scenarios, outside the AGI Growth Index.

Production baseDiversified
Workforce structureIndustrial workforce
Work organizationUnavailable
Current automationMedium current exposure

Where output comes from (% of GDP)

Agriculture 20257.6%
Industry 202517.9%
Services 202561%

Where people work (% of employment)

Agriculture 202114.1%
Industry 202125.2%
Services 202160.7%

Informal employment

Share of employmentComparable data are not available for this measure.

Current automation exposure

Tasks exposed50.5%
Interpretation of these indicators

Several parts of the economy could transmit AI’s effects. The pace depends on adoption by firms, connectivity and movement of workers between sectors.

Current automation, not AGI. The Global Automation Atlas measures economically plausible automation in typical workplaces around 2026. It is a useful baseline for where automation can enter today, not a forecast of exposure to gradual or fast AGI. Explore current task exposure in the Global Automation Atlas →

Sources: World Bank WDI; ILOSTAT; Global Automation Atlas (Garg, Crosta & Baier, 2026). The latest available year is shown for each measure; vintages differ, so shares may not sum to 100.

Country brief · simulations, not forecastsDownload the earlier brief (PDF)
This brief is being updated. It was drafted before the atlas’s latest model update, so some of its growth rates, ranks and dates differ from the figures above. Where they differ, the figures above are current.

Where Ukraine starts

Ukraine enters the AGI era as a high-risk, volatile economy: a country the model expects to be left behind under every scenario, because war and sanctions exposure sit between it and the AI supply chain. The scores split sharply. Cyber resilience is 3.9, hardened by years of defending networks under Russian attack. AI diffusion capacity is 3.1, built on a large IT services sector and the Diia digital-government platform. Climate resilience is 4.3. Against these stand the constraints of a war economy. Geopolitical positioning scores 1, the lowest band. Compute and energy access is 1.3, with the grid under sustained bombardment. Demographics score 1.5 after mass displacement. At about $5,866 per person, Ukraine is lower-middle-income, and ten-year trend growth of -1.9% a year reflects an economy at war.

The three paths

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline, and the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the Modest scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Ukraine would keep contracting slightly: -1.8% growth a year, 155th of 157. The war economy sets the ceiling, and AI adds almost nothing. Under Gradual takeoff, growth would climb over two decades and reach 3.7% a year once AGI matures around 2045, lifting Ukraine to 138th. An economy growing at 3.7% doubles in about nineteen years. The long ramp gives its IT and defense tech firms time to sell into a richer world. Under Fast takeoff, growth would reach 4.4% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling roughly every sixteen years, and Ukraine would rise five places to 133rd. Even here the rates stay modest, because a fast world rewards the compute and alliance access Ukraine does not hold. Reconstruction, EU accession and the course of the war would shape any of these paths far more than the model can capture. How Ukrainians and their government respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.

How you would know which world you are in

The scenarios look almost the same until about 2030. Watch leading indicators, not GDP, and check them live rather than trust any snapshot. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would signal a fast world; a point or two above trend by the mid-2030s, a gradual one; a fade back to trend, a modest one. Ukraine's own signals would arrive sooner: foreign contracts for its drone and defense tech firms, IT-export order books, reconstruction financing that clears, and whether the grid is rebuilt faster than it is hit.

If growth goes explosive

Explosive is the wrong word here. At 3.7% to 4.4% growth a year, Ukraine's paths are modest by world standards. The United States would be compounding many times faster, near 39% in a fast world, while Ukraine's region runs at about 16%. This is recovery from war, not a boom. Still, an economy doubling every sixteen years would roughly quadruple the wealth of a child born today by her thirties. Rising wages and labor demand at home could ease the pressure to emigrate, and draw some of the displaced back. Neither would cause the growth; both would follow it. The honest downside is demographic and geopolitical. Ukraine has lost millions of working-age people, and it enters this era compute-starved and outside any chip bloc, so it would rent capability rather than own it. The hedge is alliance and EU inclusion plus rebuilding its own power supply. Either way the test shifts to the state: reconstruction agencies, permitting offices, anti-corruption bodies and courts must move faster than ever.

What Ukraine can do now

Three levers follow from the scores, and two pay off whether or not AGI arrives. The first is physical build speed, at 1.7. Reconstruction needs faster permitting, pre-zoned land and transmission built ahead of demand regardless of AI, so this is a no-regret move. Statutory approval deadlines and one-stop permits would speed the rebuild and any future data center site alike. The second is geopolitical positioning, the weakest score at 1. Deeper EU accession and alliance inclusion — staying inside the trusted-partner frameworks that govern chip access — protects capital markets and technology supply under every scenario, another no-regret step. The third lever is the bet. Compute and energy access, at 1.3, barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under a fast takeoff it becomes Ukraine's largest lever. That means rebuilding generation, including nuclear, and packaging power and land to attract investors. DR Congo follows the same energy-first logic with its Grand Inga hydropower project, turning a natural endowment into power capacity Ukraine could adapt. A cautious government can act on the two no-regret levers today and lose nothing. Open the atlas's policy editor to see how each score reshapes Ukraine's path under each scenario.

Use the policy editor to test how different factor scores change Ukraine’s modeled path. The roadmap builder below can then incorporate those targets into a 1,000-day planning prompt.

Drafted with Claude, Anthropic’s AI model, from the atlas’s data and an editorial template set by the author.

For government planning · compatible with any AI model

Create a 1000-day AGI and growth roadmap prompt

This prompt can be used with Claude, ChatGPT or an open-weight model hosted on your institution’s systems. It includes the atlas material for Ukraine: the country brief, economic structure, region, archetype and global scenarios. It instructs the model to ask for local information, use existing strategies and the political calendar, and preserve the atlas’s interpretation rules. The prompt is assembled in your browser; the information entered here is not sent elsewhere.

1 · Read the brief  →  2 · Set targets in the policy editor →  3 · Generate and copy the prompt  →  4 · Run it with an approved model, with high reasoning effort and web access where permitted

No score targets included. Set them in the policy editor.

Instructions are generated in the selected language; the data annex remains in English. Translations are machine-drafted, and corrections from native speakers are welcome through the contact links on the start page.