

Algeria

Archetype **Resource suppliers**

GDP / person **\$6k**

Population **47M**

10-yr trend **2.1%**

Gradual **6.1%** · **#108**

Fast **8.6%** · **#81**

WHERE ALGERIA STARTS

Algeria enters the AGI era as a resource supplier — a country that sells the build-out its raw inputs. Its input is energy. Fuels make up 96% of exports, almost all of it oil and gas piped to Europe through Medgaz and Transmed or shipped as LNG by Sonatrach. Physical build speed scores 4.9 out of 5, near the top of the world: the East-West Highway, the vast Djamaa el Djazair mosque and decades of state housing show a country that can move earth and pour concrete at scale. What is missing is digital. Compute access scores 1 — Algeria has almost no data-center capacity. Climate resilience is 1.3, with Saharan heat and scarce water. At about \$6,051 per person it is lower-middle-income, and ten-year trend growth is 2.1% a year.

THE THREE PATHS

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline; the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the **Modest** scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Algeria would gain almost nothing on trend: 2.2% growth a year, 111th of 157. Its gas would keep flowing to Europe much as today. Under **Gradual** takeoff, growth would build over two decades and reach 6.1% a year once AGI matures around 2045, lifting Algeria to 108th. At that pace the economy doubles in under twelve years. The extra demand would come from a world building power and compute, which needs the fuel and electricity Algeria sells. Under **Fast** takeoff, growth would reach 8.6% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling roughly every eight years, and Algeria would climb 27 places to 81st — its sharpest gain of any scenario. A fast build-out rewards energy suppliers, and that is Algeria's one clear edge. Regulation and politics could slow or redirect any of these paths. How Algerians and their government respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.

HOW YOU WOULD KNOW WHICH WORLD YOU ARE IN

The three scenarios look almost identical until about 2030. So watch leading indicators, not GDP, and check them live rather than trust any snapshot. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task-horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier-lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would point to a fast world; a point or two above trend by the mid-2030s to a gradual one; a fade back to trend to a modest one. Algeria's own signals

would arrive sooner than the GDP figures: rising gas export volumes and prices to Europe, Sonatrach's order books, progress on the Solar 1000 programme, and any hyperscaler commitment to host compute on Algerian soil.

IF GROWTH GOES EXPLOSIVE

Explosive is relative. At 8.6% growth a year under the Fast scenario, Algeria would still trail the frontier badly — the United States would be compounding at nearly 39% — and it would sit below the MENA median of 16.1%. But it would run four times faster than its own recent history. The economy would double roughly every eight years, so a child born today would finish school in a country twice as rich. Gas and power exports to a building world could swell the budget, and rising wages at home could ease the pressure on young Algerians to emigrate for work. There is a way this leaves Algeria worse off, and it is worth naming. A commodity boom is not a development strategy. If the energy rents are spent rather than converted into industry and skills, they evaporate when demand shifts, and the compute Algeria hosts would be rented from abroad, not owned. The hedge is to turn the windfall into owned capability while it lasts. Even a boom would test the state: Sonatrach, Sonelgaz, the energy ministry and the fuel-subsidy system would have to permit, invest and diversify faster than they ever have.

WHAT ALGERIA CAN DO NOW

Three levers follow from the scores, and two pay off whether or not AGI arrives. The first is AI diffusion, at 3, which carries real weight even in the skeptic's world. Digital skills, permissive rules for deploying AI and digitized government services would raise productivity under every scenario, so this is a no-regret move. The second is geopolitical positioning, at 2. Avoiding sanctions exposure, keeping access to capital markets and negotiating trusted-partner terms for technology pay off regardless of takeoff speed — another no-regret step. The third lever is the bet. Compute and energy access, at 1, barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under a fast takeoff it becomes Algeria's single biggest lever, weighted most heavily of the three. Closing it means packaging Saharan power, land and fast permits to attract data-center investment. Algeria can adapt a working model from a fellow resource supplier: Chile launched a national data-centre plan in 2024, using cool climate and clean power to court hyperscalers. A cautious government can act on the two no-regret levers today at no loss. Open the atlas's [policy editor](#) to see how moving these scores reshapes Algeria's path under each scenario.

The three levers — and which pay off regardless

AI diffusion capacity

score 3 / 5 · weight 24 under skeptic → 13 under fast takeoff

Counts under the Modest scenario too (24→13). Closing this gap pays off whether or not AGI arrives.

No-regret

Compute & energy access

score 1 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 24 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 24 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet

Trusted chip & tech access


score 2 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 12 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 12 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet


The no-regret levers pay off in every scenario, so a cautious government can act on them today. The AGI bets become decisive only if takeoff is real.

GDP per person to 2060, by scenario



Linear scale; solid lines are the three scenarios, dashed grey the no-AI baseline. Growth ramps from 2027 to each scenario's rate at its AGI year (Fast ~2030, Gradual ~2045), then holds. Timing and divergence are the point, not end levels; steep paths exit the top of the capped axis.

The nine factors



Solid: Algeria. Dashed: the median of its archetype. Scores are relative to the other 156 countries (3 ≈ global median, 5 = leading today).

Outcomes under each scenario

SCENARIO	GROWTH / YR	WORLD RANK	INDEX	DOUBLING
Modest	2.2%	111 / 157	51.8	—
Gradual	6.1%	108 / 157	50.3	11.7 yrs
Fast	8.6%	81 / 157	48.9	8.4 yrs

Post-AGI growth rate, rank among 157 countries, AGI Growth Index (0–100, scenario-weighted), and the implied economy doubling time. The Modest path is the baseline the AGI scenarios fork from.

THE THREE SCENARIOS

Modest the Acemoglu view

AI as a normal productivity tool

Intelligence was never the binding constraint on growth, so AI delivers real but ordinary gains. Each country gets a one-time boost of a couple of percent of GDP, phased in through 2035; growth then returns to trend. The mainstream-economics view.

≤0.66% TFP over a decade — a one-time gain

Algeria: 2.2% growth a year · #111 of 157

Gradual Erdil & Besiroglu, base case

Broad automation, on a long timeline

Broad automation of remote work arrives around 2045, with gains building slowly from the late 2020s. Growth then reaches up to ~20% a year for the best-positioned countries — ten times today's frontier trend. A slow arrival gives countries time to adapt, so the gains are wide but uneven.

up to ~20%/yr after 2045 — 10× the frontier trend

Algeria: 6.1% growth a year · #108 of 157

Fast Erdil & Besiroglu, fast takeoff

Fast takeoff — today's infrastructure decides

Transformation lands around 2030, before countries can adjust. Whoever already owns compute, capital and the ability to build wins; the gap between countries widens dramatically — and some are left growing slower than they would have without AGI.

up to ~40%/yr from 2030

Algeria: 8.6% growth a year · #81 of 157

Factor scores — and where policy bites



◆ marks this country's highest-leverage policy targets: the weakest factors carrying the most weight under the AGI scenarios. The atlas's interactive policy editor (agigrowth.org/#editor) simulates how raising any score changes growth under each scenario.

Archetype: Resource suppliers

They sell the build-out its inputs — copper, fuels, bauxite, iron ore, uranium.

Wins: The physical build-out — the one lower-income group with terms-of-trade upside under fast takeoff.

Watch: A commodity boom is not a development strategy; the rents must be converted or they evaporate.

Chile **14%** · #19

Colombia **12.1%** · #36

Peru **11.1%** · #42

Kazakhstan **9.7%** · #58

Mongolia **8.5%** · #77

Tajikistan **7.4%** · #93

Zambia **6.6%** · #100

Guinea **6.2%** · #107

Kuwait **6%** · #111

Niger **6%** · #112

The regional picture — Petro-capital pours into compute.

The Gulf is running the clearest experiment in buying a place in the AI economy. Sovereign capital converts hydrocarbons into compute: the UAE and Saudi Arabia have secured government-to-government chip-access agreements and anchor announced build-outs far beyond their economic size, and the UAE posts the world's highest measured AI adoption — about 70% of its working-age population in Microsoft's 2026 data. The dependency is explicit: those agreements, not geography, connect Gulf capital to frontier silicon, and they are revocable at each turn of American politics. The physical constraint is just as explicit: more than 180 days a year above 35°C makes cooling the binding input and water the scarcest one. Israel supplies the region's frontier R&D; Morocco builds steadily at Atlantic temperatures and positions itself as Europe's southern energy partner; Egypt has the population without the complements; Iraq pairs oil with the region's weakest institutions. The twenty-year test of the Gulf model is whether bought compute becomes owned capability — or remains a well-provisioned tenancy.

Method, in brief

Each country is scored 1–5 on nine factors from public data (World Bank, Epoch AI, ITU, IMF and national sources). A scenario-weighted average forms the AGI Growth Index (0–100), which maps to a post-AGI growth rate inside ceilings derived from Erdil & Besiroglu (2023): ~20% growth a year for the best-positioned country under Gradual takeoff (AGI ~2045), ~40% under Fast (AGI ~2030); growth ramps convexly from 2027. The scenario sets the growth rates on offer; the index only decides where each country sits within them. The Modest scenario is the skeptics' baseline — a small uplift on each country's own ten-year trend. These are simulations for structured thinking, not forecasts; no probabilities are attached to any scenario.

Watch the global signals live: the METR task-horizon curve at metr.org/time-horizons · frontier-lab revenue at epoch.ai/ai-companies · AI-chip spending at epoch.ai/ai-chip-sales.

Explore further: full methodology agigrowth.org/#methodology · map & rankings agigrowth.org/#explore · country profiles agigrowth.org/#countries · policy editor agigrowth.org/#editor