



# Belize

Archetype **Stalled middle**GDP / person **\$8k**Population **0.42M**10-yr trend **2.4%**Gradual **6.1%** · **#109**Fast **5.2%** · **#118**

## WHERE BELIZE STARTS

Belize enters the AGI era as a stalled middle economy: middling income, middling scores, slow growth. At about \$7,865 per person it sits in the middle of the pack, and ten-year trend growth of 2.4% a year has kept it there. The scores explain the label. Its standout strength is demographics and migration at 4.8 out of 5 — a young, growing population and a large diaspora in the United States. Catch-up headroom is 3.7, the room a smaller economy has to grow by adopting what others invent. English as an official language lifts language inclusion to 3.1. The constraints are physical. Compute and energy access scores 1, the lowest band: Belize has almost no data-center capacity and a small grid that leans on power imported from Mexico. Physical build speed is 1.2. The economy runs on tourism, sugar, citrus and seafood.

## THE THREE PATHS

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline, and the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the **Modest** scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Belize would gain a fraction on trend: 2.5% growth a year, 95th of 157. Gains would arrive imported and late, as they long have. Under **Gradual** takeoff, growth would climb over two decades and reach 6.1% a year once AGI matures around 2045, ranking 109th. At that rate the economy doubles in a little under twelve years. The long ramp gives Belize time to absorb tools built elsewhere. Under **Fast** takeoff, growth would reach 5.2% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling in under fourteen years — lower than the Gradual rate, and 118th in the world. A fast world puts more weight on the compute and frontier access Belize does not hold, so its rank slips nine places even as growth stays above trend. Regulation and politics could slow or redirect any of these paths. How Belizeans and their government respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.

## HOW YOU WOULD KNOW WHICH WORLD YOU ARE IN

The scenarios look almost the same until about 2030, so watch leading indicators rather than GDP, and watch them live. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task-horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at [metr.org](https://metr.org). Second, whether frontier-lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at [epoch.ai](https://epoch.ai). Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would signal a fast world; a point or

two above trend by the mid-2030s a gradual one; a fade back to trend a modest one. Belize's own signals would arrive earlier than the growth data: English-language call-center and back-office contracts, tourism booking volumes as AI reshapes travel, remittance flows from the US diaspora, and any firm commitment to digitize government services or upgrade the Mexico grid link.

## IF GROWTH GOES EXPLOSIVE

Explosive is the wrong word for Belize. At 6.1% growth a year under Gradual, it would trail a frontier compounding at 19.5%, and even the Latin American median of 8.1%. Under Fast the gap widens: 5.2% against a frontier near 39% and a regional median of 9.2%. This is the stalled middle's problem — gains arrive, but the distance to every faster group grows year by year. Still, 5% to 6% would beat Belize's own record. An economy doubling every twelve years or so would roughly quadruple within a working lifetime, and rising wages could ease the pull that sends young Belizeans abroad for work. The honest downside is drift and brain drain. Belize's young, English-speaking workers are the very people who can move, and a faster world elsewhere would pull them harder. Its compute would be rented from abroad and priced there. The hedge is to keep talent home by building skills and digital jobs locally. Even a modest lift would test a small state: one power ministry, a lean public service, and courts that must permit, adjudicate and count faster than before.

## WHAT BELIZE CAN DO NOW

Three levers follow from the scores. Start with the one that pays off whether or not AGI arrives. AI diffusion, at 2.2, carries real weight even in the skeptic's world: digital skills, permissive deployment and digitized government lift growth under every scenario. That makes it the no-regret move, and a cautious government can act on it today at no loss. English is already an asset here; the task is to turn it into digital work. The second no-regret lever is physical build speed, at 1.2. Statutory permitting deadlines, one-stop approvals and pre-zoned land help any investment, and they are cheap to legislate for a small administration. The third lever is the bet. Compute and energy access, at 1, barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under fast takeoff it becomes Belize's single biggest lever. Closing it means packaging land, power and permits and firming up the grid, since Belize cannot fund a build alone. Cabo Verde, a fellow small state, has pursued this through its Praia technology park and undersea-cable links. Open the atlas's [policy editor](#) to test how raising these scores shifts Belize's path under each scenario.

## The three levers — and which pay off regardless

### AI diffusion capacity

score 2.2 / 5 · weight 24 under skeptic → 13 under fast takeoff

Counts under the Modest scenario too (24→13). Closing this gap pays off whether or not AGI arrives.

No-regret

### Compute & energy access

score 1 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 24 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 24 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet

### Physical build speed


score 1.2 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 17 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 17 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet


The no-regret levers pay off in every scenario, so a cautious government can act on them today. The AGI bets become decisive only if takeoff is real.

## GDP per person to 2060, by scenario



Linear scale; solid lines are the three scenarios, dashed grey the no-AI baseline. Growth ramps from 2027 to each scenario's rate at its AGI year (Fast ~2030, Gradual ~2045), then holds. Timing and divergence are the point, not end levels; steep paths exit the top of the capped axis.

### The nine factors



Solid: Belize. Dashed: the median of its archetype. Scores are relative to the other 156 countries (3 ≈ global median, 5 = leading today).

### Outcomes under each scenario

| SCENARIO | GROWTH / YR | WORLD RANK | INDEX | DOUBLING |
|----------|-------------|------------|-------|----------|
| Modest   | 2.5%        | 95 / 157   | 53.6  | —        |
| Gradual  | 6.1%        | 109 / 157  | 49.7  | 11.7 yrs |
| Fast     | 5.2%        | 118 / 157  | 41.7  | 13.7 yrs |

Post-AGI growth rate, rank among 157 countries, AGI Growth Index (0–100, scenario-weighted), and the implied economy doubling time. The Modest path is the baseline the AGI scenarios fork from.

#### THE THREE SCENARIOS

##### Modest the Acemoglu view

##### AI as a normal productivity tool

Intelligence was never the binding constraint on growth, so AI delivers real but ordinary gains. Each country gets a one-time boost of a couple of percent of GDP, phased in through 2035; growth then returns to trend. The mainstream-economics view.

≤0.66% TFP over a decade — a one-time gain

Belize: 2.5% growth a year · #95 of 157

##### Gradual Erdil & Besiroglu, base case

##### Broad automation, on a long timeline

Broad automation of remote work arrives around 2045, with gains building slowly from the late 2020s. Growth then reaches up to ~20% a year for the best-positioned countries — ten times today's frontier trend. A slow arrival gives countries time to adapt, so the gains are wide but uneven.

up to ~20%/yr after 2045 — 10× the frontier trend

Belize: 6.1% growth a year · #109 of 157

##### Fast Erdil & Besiroglu, fast takeoff


##### Fast takeoff — today's infrastructure decides

Transformation lands around 2030, before countries can adjust. Whoever already owns compute, capital and the ability to build wins; the gap between countries widens dramatically — and some are left growing slower than they would have without AGI.

up to ~40%/yr from 2030

Belize: 5.2% growth a year · #118 of 157

## Factor scores — and where policy bites



♦ marks this country's highest-leverage policy targets: the weakest factors carrying the most weight under the AGI scenarios. The atlas's interactive policy editor ([agigrowth.org/#editor](https://agigrowth.org/#editor)) simulates how raising any score changes growth under each scenario.

## Archetype: Stalled middle

**Neither frontier nor fragile: middling income, middling scores, slow growth — at every size, from micro-states to Brazil.**

Wins: No clean window — gains arrive imported, and late.

Watch: Drift: the gap to every faster group compounds year by year.

Jordan 11.8% · #37

Brazil 11% · #43

Mexico 10.4% · #48

Ecuador 10% · #54

Thailand 10% · #55

Slovakia 9.6% · #59

Argentina 9.5% · #61

Lithuania 9.3% · #63

Cabo Verde 9.3% · #64

Croatia 9.1% · #67

## The regional picture — Mid-table, and outside the blocs.

Latin America enters the era mid-table on almost every factor — and mostly outside the blocs that decide access. Chile leads on institutions and hosts real compute; Brazil and Mexico have hyperscaler regions and huge domestic markets but thin R&D; Uruguay and Costa Rica absorb well at small scale; Guyana is converting an oil windfall into the hemisphere's fastest construction boom. The region's twenty-year question is what happens to nearshoring: the manufacturing and services work that moved toward Mexico and Central America on labor costs is the work automation reprices first, and no country here has a plan B at scale. Distance from the US-China rivalry cuts both ways — few export controls apply, and few strategic investments arrive. Under the modest lens the region loses little; under fast takeoff it drifts: gains arrive, mostly imported, mostly late, and the gap to the frontier compounds year by year.

## Method, in brief

Each country is scored 1–5 on nine factors from public data (World Bank, Epoch AI, ITU, IMF and national sources). A scenario-weighted average forms the AGI Growth Index (0–100), which maps to a post-AGI growth rate inside ceilings derived from Erdil & Besiroglu (2023): ~20% growth a year for the best-positioned country under Gradual takeoff (AGI ~2045), ~40% under Fast (AGI ~2030); growth ramps convexly from 2027. The scenario sets the growth rates on offer; the index only decides where each country sits within them. The Modest scenario is the skeptics' baseline — a small uplift on each country's own ten-year trend. These are simulations for structured thinking, not forecasts; no probabilities are attached to any scenario.

**Watch the global signals live:** the METR task-horizon curve at [metr.org/time-horizons](https://metr.org/time-horizons) · frontier-lab revenue at [epoch.ai/ai-companies](https://epoch.ai/ai-companies) · AI-chip spending at [epoch.ai/ai-chip-sales](https://epoch.ai/ai-chip-sales).

**Explore further:** full methodology [agigrowth.org/#methodology](https://agigrowth.org/#methodology) · map & rankings [agigrowth.org/#explore](https://agigrowth.org/#explore) · country profiles [agigrowth.org/#countries](https://agigrowth.org/#countries) · policy editor [agigrowth.org/#editor](https://agigrowth.org/#editor)