

Georgia

Archetype **Reform climbers**

GDP / person **\$10k**

Population **3.9M**

10-yr trend **5.6%**

Gradual **8%** · **#84**

Fast **8%** · **#86**

WHERE GEORGIA STARTS

Georgia is a reform climber: a small economy growing steadily from a low base while its institutions improve. The scores show both the momentum and the ceiling. Climate and environmental resilience is 4.5 out of 5, cyber resilience 3.4, and catch-up headroom 3 — room to grow by adopting what richer countries already use. Georgia earned its reformer name through business-registration reforms, the Public Service Hall, and a decade of anti-corruption work; it won EU candidate status in 2023. Its binding constraints are structural. Compute and energy access scores 1.1, with almost no data-center capacity. Demographics and migration is 1.4: the population of 3.9 million is aging and long shaped by emigration. Geopolitical positioning is 2, the price of sitting between Russia and the West. Ten-year trend growth is 5.6% a year, at about \$9,692 per person.

THE THREE PATHS

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline; the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the **Modest** scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Georgia would hold its momentum at 5.7% growth a year and rank 13th of 157 — high, because in a skeptic's world few countries accelerate and Georgia's underlying trend is already strong. At that pace the economy doubles in about twelve and a half years. Under **Gradual** takeoff, growth would climb over two decades and reach 8% a year around 2045. Yet Georgia's rank would fall to 84th, because the AGI-ready economies pull far ahead while Georgia gains only modestly. An economy growing at 8% doubles in nine years. Under **Fast** takeoff, growth would also reach 8% a year, arriving from the early 2030s, and rank 86th. The same nine-year doubling applies. The lesson is stark: Georgia rises in absolute terms but slips in the standings, because it lacks the compute and alignment a fast world rewards. Politics could slow or redirect any path. How Georgians and their government respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.

HOW YOU WOULD KNOW WHICH WORLD YOU ARE IN

The three scenarios look almost identical until about 2030, so watch leading indicators, not GDP, and check them live rather than trust any snapshot. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task-horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier-lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would point to a fast world. A point or two above trend by the mid-2030s would

point to a gradual one. A fade back to trend would point to a modest one. Georgia's own signals would arrive earlier than the GDP data: Middle Corridor freight volumes across the Caspian, EU accession milestones and the reforms they require, any hyperscaler or hosting commitment on Georgian soil, and adoption rates for its digital public services.

IF GROWTH GOES EXPLOSIVE

Explosive is relative, and for Georgia the honest word is modest. At 8% growth a year, Georgia would run above its own 5.6% trend, but only a little, and just below the regional median of 8.7% under a gradual takeoff. The frontier, by contrast, would compound at 19.5% and, in a fast world, 39.2%. Georgia would grow richer yet fall behind the leaders. At 8% the economy doubles every nine years: a child starting school now would finish university in a country twice as large. Rising wages could ease the pressure to emigrate and draw some of the diaspora home, though that would follow growth, not cause it. The real danger is dependence. Georgia rents compute it does not own and cannot make; whoever supplies its models would shape its economic alignment. Squeezed between Russia and the West, it risks becoming a rule-taker inside another power's chip regime, exposed to sanctions and abrupt repricing. The hedge is to secure trusted-partner access early and build some capacity at home. Even then, the pace-setter would shift to the state, testing how fast Georgia's permitting offices, energy regulator and courts can approve and adjudicate.

WHAT GEORGIA CAN DO NOW

Three levers follow from the scores, and two pay off whether or not AGI arrives. Start with the no-regret moves. AI diffusion capacity, at 2.8, carries real weight even in the skeptic's world. Georgia already leads its region on digital government, so the task is to protect that strength and extend it: broaden digital skills, keep deployment rules permissive, and put more public services online. The second no-regret lever is geopolitical positioning, at 2. Deepening EU alignment, staying clear of sanctions and holding access to capital markets matter today, and they would decide which chips Georgia can buy tomorrow. A cautious government can act on both now and lose nothing if the skeptics are right. The third lever is the bet. Compute and energy access, at 1.1, barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under a fast takeoff it becomes Georgia's largest lever, near a fifth of the weight. Closing it means packaging hydropower, land and fast permits to draw data-center investment. Senegal shows one path: it built a national data center at Diamniadio to bring government data home rather than rent it abroad. To see how moving these scores changes Georgia's path under each scenario, open the atlas's [policy editor](#).

The three levers — and which pay off regardless

AI diffusion capacity

score 2.8 / 5 · weight 24 under skeptic → 13 under fast takeoff

Counts under the Modest scenario too (24→13). Closing this gap pays off whether or not AGI arrives.

No-regret

Compute & energy access

score 1.1 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 24 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 24 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet

Trusted chip & tech access


score 2 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 12 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 12 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet


The no-regret levers pay off in every scenario, so a cautious government can act on them today. The AGI bets become decisive only if takeoff is real.

GDP per person to 2060, by scenario



Linear scale; solid lines are the three scenarios, dashed grey the no-AI baseline. Growth ramps from 2027 to each scenario's rate at its AGI year (Fast ~2030, Gradual ~2045), then holds. Timing and divergence are the point, not end levels; steep paths exit the top of the capped axis.

The nine factors



Solid: Georgia. Dashed: the median of its archetype. Scores are relative to the other 156 countries (3 ≈ global median, 5 = leading today).

Outcomes under each scenario

SCENARIO	GROWTH / YR	WORLD RANK	INDEX	DOUBLING
Modest	5.7%	13 / 157	52	12.5 yrs
Gradual	8%	84 / 157	49.4	9 yrs
Fast	8%	86 / 157	46.4	9 yrs

Post-AGI growth rate, rank among 157 countries, AGI Growth Index (0–100, scenario-weighted), and the implied economy doubling time. The Modest path is the baseline the AGI scenarios fork from.

THE THREE SCENARIOS

Modest the Acemoglu view

AI as a normal productivity tool

Intelligence was never the binding constraint on growth, so AI delivers real but ordinary gains. Each country gets a one-time boost of a couple of percent of GDP, phased in through 2035; growth then returns to trend. The mainstream-economics view.

≤0.66% TFP over a decade — a one-time gain

Georgia: 5.7% growth a year · #13 of 157

Gradual Erdil & Besiroglu, base case

Broad automation, on a long timeline

Broad automation of remote work arrives around 2045, with gains building slowly from the late 2020s. Growth then reaches up to ~20% a year for the best-positioned countries — ten times today's frontier trend. A slow arrival gives countries time to adapt, so the gains are wide but uneven.

up to ~20%/yr after 2045 — 10× the frontier trend

Georgia: 8% growth a year · #84 of 157

Fast Erdil & Besiroglu, fast takeoff


Fast takeoff — today's infrastructure decides

Transformation lands around 2030, before countries can adjust. Whoever already owns compute, capital and the ability to build wins; the gap between countries widens dramatically — and some are left growing slower than they would have without AGI.

up to ~40%/yr from 2030

Georgia: 8% growth a year · #86 of 157

Factor scores — and where policy bites



♦ marks this country's highest-leverage policy targets: the weakest factors carrying the most weight under the AGI scenarios. The atlas's interactive policy editor (agigrowth.org/#editor) simulates how raising any score changes growth under each scenario.

Archetype: Reform climbers

Actually climbing: sustained growth from a low base, with improving institutions.

Wins: The gradual world, where two decades of adjustment time reward momentum.

Watch: The climb runs through the very labor-intensive rungs automation removes.

Dominican Republic **10.6%** · #47

Senegal **9.6%** · #60

Kyrgyzstan **9%** · #70

Rwanda **8.9%** · #72

Laos **8.2%** · #81

Côte d'Ivoire **7.6%** · #87

Djibouti **7.6%** · #88

Kosovo **7.4%** · #91

Ghana **7.4%** · #92

Benin **7.2%** · #97

The regional picture — Russia cut off; Central Asia hedging.

Russia has the engineers and the energy of a serious AI power and none of the access: sanctioned out of the chip supply chain, cut off from Western capital, demographically shrinking. Its path through the next twenty years runs on Chinese hardware and domestic adaptation of open-weight models — a dependent's version of sovereignty, workable but always a step behind. Central Asia is playing a different game. Kazakhstan converts energy into sovereign-AI ambitions and courts Washington, Beijing and Moscow simultaneously; Uzbekistan reforms fastest from the youngest population base; the Caucasus states are small, capable and squeezed by geography. The region illustrates a rule the era will generalize: countries that can neither make nor freely buy frontier compute end up using whatever their strongest partner supplies — and their economic alignment follows their model supply. Given AGI, Eurasia's fortunes track whoever provisions its compute.

Method, in brief

Each country is scored 1–5 on nine factors from public data (World Bank, Epoch AI, ITU, IMF and national sources). A scenario-weighted average forms the AGI Growth Index (0–100), which maps to a post-AGI growth rate inside ceilings derived from Erdil & Besiroglu (2023): ~20% growth a year for the best-positioned country under Gradual takeoff (AGI ~2045), ~40% under Fast (AGI ~2030); growth ramps convexly from 2027. The scenario sets the growth rates on offer; the index only decides where each country sits within them. The Modest scenario is the skeptics' baseline — a small uplift on each country's own ten-year trend. These are simulations for structured thinking, not forecasts; no probabilities are attached to any scenario.

Watch the global signals live: the METR task-horizon curve at metr.org/time-horizons · frontier-lab revenue at epoch.ai/ai-companies · AI-chip spending at epoch.ai/ai-chip-sales.

Explore further: full methodology agigrowth.org/#methodology · map & rankings agigrowth.org/#explore · country profiles agigrowth.org/#countries · policy editor agigrowth.org/#editor