



Haiti

Archetype **High-risk/volatile**GDP / person **\$3k**Population **11.91M**10-yr trend **-0.7%**Gradual **2.4%** · **#153**Fast **1.4%** · **#157**

WHERE HAITI STARTS

Haiti enters the AGI era in the high-risk, volatile tier: cut off from the AI supply chain, with a state too fragile to turn new technology into growth. The scores show why. Compute and energy access and cyber resilience both sit at 1 out of 5, the floor. Physical build speed is 1.2, and AI diffusion capacity 1.7. The one high score, catch-up headroom at 4.5, only measures how far behind Haiti starts. A young population (demographics 3.6) and wide French and Creole use (language 3.5) are real, but they rest on little else. Ten-year trend growth is minus 0.7% a year; the economy has been shrinking. At about \$2,694 per person, Haiti is lower-income. Caracol Industrial Park still stitches apparel for the United States, but Électricité d'Haïti delivers little reliable power. As the regional picture says, state fragility rather than technology will decide the next twenty years.

THE THREE PATHS

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline, and the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the **Modest** scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Haiti's economy would keep contracting slightly: minus 0.6% growth a year, 152nd of 157. Under **Gradual** takeoff, growth would build over two decades and reach 2.4% a year once AGI matures around 2045, ranking 153rd. That is barely above the region's own path, because Haiti has almost none of the inputs — power, chips, capital, builders — that turn machine intelligence into output. Under **Fast** takeoff, growth would reach only 1.4% a year from the early 2030s, and Haiti would fall to 157th, last in the sample. A fast world rewards compute and build speed, and Haiti holds neither, so it gains least where others gain most. Even then, 1.4% stays above the shrinking trend. Regulation and politics could slow or redirect any path, depending on how Haitians and their leaders respond to transformative AI — a variable the model holds constant, and one that here means whether the state stabilizes at all.

HOW YOU WOULD KNOW WHICH WORLD YOU ARE IN

The scenarios look almost identical until about 2030, so watch leading indicators, not GDP, and check them live rather than trust any snapshot. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task-horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier-lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United

States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would signal a fast world; a point or two above trend by the mid-2030s, a gradual one; a fade back to trend, a modest one. Haiti's own tells would arrive earlier than any growth figure: the security situation in Port-au-Prince, whether Caracol's order books hold, and whether electricity generation and port customs become dependable.

IF GROWTH GOES EXPLOSIVE

For Haiti, explosive is the wrong word. Its rates stay modest under every scenario. At 2.4% growth a year in the Gradual world, Haiti would fall further behind a frontier compounding at 19.5%, and it would trail the Caribbean median of 3.1%. The Fast world is starker: 1.4% growth against a frontier near 39% and a regional median of 4.7%. This is relative decline, not catch-up, though it stays above today's shrinking trend. On the ground the change would be small: a little more output, some digital services reaching a young workforce, and, if wages rose, slightly less pressure on Haitians to emigrate — growth would ease that pressure, not the reverse. The honest downside is exclusion. A country with compute access at 1 rents whatever intelligence it uses and owns none of it, so the terms are set abroad and its most skilled people keep leaving. The hedge is to keep talent and build basic connectivity at home. The real stress test comes first: restoring security in Port-au-Prince, making Électricité d'Haïti deliver power, and running the ports and customs a modern economy needs.

WHAT HAITI CAN DO NOW

Three levers follow from the scores, and the order matters. The two no-regret moves pay off whether or not AGI arrives. First is AI diffusion capacity, at 1.7: basic digital skills and digitizing government services would raise productivity in the skeptic's world too. Second is physical build speed, at 1.2: clearer permitting, pre-zoned land and more skilled construction labor help any economy. A cautious government can start on both today and lose nothing if the skeptics are right. The third lever is the bet. Compute and energy access, at 1, carries the most weight under Fast but barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary. Closing it means reliable power first, then land-and-power packages to draw investment — hard for a \$32bn economy to fund alone. Haiti can borrow a model from an archetype peer: Ukraine built Diia, a single app that puts government services and documents online, even under severe strain. Open the atlas's [policy editor](#) to test how lifting each score reshapes Haiti's path.

The three levers — and which pay off regardless

AI diffusion capacity

score 1.7 / 5 · weight 24 under skeptic → 13 under fast takeoff

Counts under the Modest scenario too (24→13). Closing this gap pays off whether or not AGI arrives.

No-regret

Compute & energy access

score 1 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 24 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 24 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet

Physical build speed


score 1.2 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 17 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 17 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet


The no-regret levers pay off in every scenario, so a cautious government can act on them today. The AGI bets become decisive only if takeoff is real.

GDP per person to 2060, by scenario



Linear scale; solid lines are the three scenarios, dashed grey the no-AI baseline. Growth ramps from 2027 to each scenario's rate at its AGI year (Fast ~2030, Gradual ~2045), then holds. Timing and divergence are the point, not end levels; steep paths exit the top of the capped axis.

The nine factors



Solid: Haiti. Dashed: the median of its archetype. Scores are relative to the other 156 countries (3 ≈ global median, 5 = leading today).

Outcomes under each scenario

SCENARIO	GROWTH / YR	WORLD RANK	INDEX	DOUBLING
Modest	-0.6%	152 / 157	48.3	—
Gradual	2.4%	153 / 157	45.4	—
Fast	1.4%	157 / 157	38	—

Post-AGI growth rate, rank among 157 countries, AGI Growth Index (0–100, scenario-weighted), and the implied economy doubling time. The Modest path is the baseline the AGI scenarios fork from.

THE THREE SCENARIOS

Modest the Acemoglu view

AI as a normal productivity tool

Intelligence was never the binding constraint on growth, so AI delivers real but ordinary gains. Each country gets a one-time boost of a couple of percent of GDP, phased in through 2035; growth then returns to trend. The mainstream-economics view.

≤0.66% TFP over a decade — a one-time gain

Haiti: -0.6% growth a year · #152 of 157

Gradual Erdil & Besiroglu, base case

Broad automation, on a long timeline

Broad automation of remote work arrives around 2045, with gains building slowly from the late 2020s. Growth then reaches up to ~20% a year for the best-positioned countries — ten times today's frontier trend. A slow arrival gives countries time to adapt, so the gains are wide but uneven.

up to ~20%/yr after 2045 — 10× the frontier trend

Haiti: 2.4% growth a year · #153 of 157

Fast Erdil & Besiroglu, fast takeoff

Fast takeoff — today's infrastructure decides

Transformation lands around 2030, before countries can adjust. Whoever already owns compute, capital and the ability to build wins; the gap between countries widens dramatically — and some are left growing slower than they would have without AGI.

up to ~40%/yr from 2030

Haiti: 1.4% growth a year · #157 of 157

Factor scores — and where policy bites



♦ marks this country's highest-leverage policy targets: the weakest factors carrying the most weight under the AGI scenarios. The atlas's interactive policy editor (agigrowth.org/#editor) simulates how raising any score changes growth under each scenario.

Archetype: High-risk/volatile

Cut off from the AI supply chain, or state capacity too weak or unstable to convert AI into growth.

Wins: Left behind under every lens.

Watch: Sanctions, conflict, fragile institutions, compute-starved.

DR Congo 9.2% · #65

Russia 8.7% · #74

Nicaragua 5.8% · #115

Papua New Guinea 5.8% · #117

Burundi 5.2% · #125

Mali 5.2% · #126

Republic of Congo 4.9% · #131

Ukraine 3.7% · #138

Madagascar 3.7% · #139

Myanmar 3.6% · #141

The regional picture — Small, open, service-led — exposed at both ends.

The Caribbean's economies are small, open and service-led: tourism and offshore finance in the Bahamas and Barbados, gas and petrochemicals in Trinidad & Tobago, services and diaspora ties in Jamaica. English proficiency and workable institutions help absorption, and an AGI-era boom in rich-country incomes would, if it comes, lift the tourism these economies sell. But nothing here changes the arithmetic of scale: no build story, hurricane exposure that climate change worsens, and gains that arrive as cheaper imported services rather than owned capability. Haiti is the region's hardest case and sits in the high-risk tier — state fragility, not technology, will decide its next twenty years. For the rest, the plausible path is steady, imported improvement: better tools, cheaper services, little leverage.

Method, in brief

Each country is scored 1–5 on nine factors from public data (World Bank, Epoch AI, ITU, IMF and national sources). A scenario-weighted average forms the AGI Growth Index (0–100), which maps to a post-AGI growth rate inside ceilings derived from Erdil & Besiroglu (2023): ~20% growth a year for the best-positioned country under Gradual takeoff (AGI ~2045), ~40% under Fast (AGI ~2030); growth ramps convexly from 2027. The scenario sets the growth rates on offer; the index only decides where each country sits within them. The Modest scenario is the skeptics' baseline — a small uplift on each country's own ten-year trend. These are simulations for structured thinking, not forecasts; no probabilities are attached to any scenario.

Watch the global signals live: the METR task-horizon curve at metr.org/time-horizons · frontier-lab revenue at epoch.ai/ai-companies · AI-chip spending at epoch.ai/ai-chip-sales.

Explore further: full methodology agigrowth.org/#methodology · map & rankings agigrowth.org/#explore · country profiles agigrowth.org/#countries · policy editor agigrowth.org/#editor