

Kosovo

Archetype **Reform climbers**

GDP / person **\$8k**

Population **1.58M**

10-yr trend **4.3%**

Gradual **7.4%** · **#91**

Fast **6%** · **#110**

WHERE KOSOVO STARTS

Kosovo enters the AGI era as a reform climber: a small economy growing steadily from a low base while its institutions improve. The scores explain the label. Catch-up headroom is 3.3 and AI diffusion capacity 3.2, both signs of an economy with room to grow and a young workforce ready to take up new tools. Climate and environmental resilience is its strongest score at 4. What holds it back is structural. Compute and energy access scores 1, the lowest band; the grid still leans on aging lignite plants. Language inclusion is 1.2, and contested statehood keeps geopolitical positioning at 2. At about \$8,000 per person, with 1.6 million people and Europe's youngest population, Kosovo has momentum. Ten-year trend growth of 4.3% a year is among the fastest in the Western Balkans.

THE THREE PATHS

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline; the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the Modest scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Kosovo would hold near its trend at 4.4% growth a year, 39th of 157 — a strong rank, because steady catch-up growth looks good when nobody is racing ahead. That economy doubles in about 16 years. Under **Gradual** takeoff, growth would build for two decades and reach 7.4% a year once AGI matures around 2045, doubling in under ten years. Yet Kosovo's rank would fall to 91st, because faster-growing economies pull ahead. This two-decade runway suits Kosovo best: it rewards momentum and gives its young workforce time to adjust. Under **Fast** takeoff, growth would reach 6% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling in about twelve years, and the rank would slip further to 110th. A fast world puts heavy weight on the compute and frontier access Kosovo does not hold, so its gains are real but smaller than under Gradual. Regulation and politics could slow or redirect any path. How Kosovars and their leaders respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.

HOW YOU WOULD KNOW WHICH WORLD YOU ARE IN

The three scenarios look almost identical until about 2030, so watch leading indicators, not GDP, and check them live. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task-horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier-lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China

above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would point to a fast world; a point or two above trend by the mid-2030s to a gradual one; a fade back to trend to a modest one. Kosovo's own tells would arrive sooner: the order books of its software and outsourcing firms, diaspora investment flows, EU accession milestones, and financial close on new solar and grid projects.

IF GROWTH GOES EXPLOSIVE

For Kosovo, explosive is relative. Even its best case, 7.4% growth a year under Gradual, sits below the regional median of 10.4% and far behind a frontier compounding at nearly 20%. Kosovo would climb faster than its own history but slower than its neighbors. Still, doubling every ten years is transformative: a child starting school would finish it in an economy twice as large. The mix would shift toward services and software, and rising wages at home would ease the pressure on young Kosovars to emigrate for work. There is a way this leaves Kosovo worse off. Its contested statehood keeps it outside many trusted-partner frameworks, so it risks becoming a rule-taker inside chip regimes set elsewhere, renting compute it cannot own. Its young talent could also be pulled abroad faster as booming economies bid for skills. The hedge is to lock in alliance access early and give skilled workers reasons to stay. Even then, the pace-setter shifts to the state, testing whether Kosovo's permitting offices, energy regulator and courts can approve and connect projects fast enough.

WHAT KOSOVO CAN DO NOW

Three levers follow from the scores, and two pay off whether or not AGI arrives. The first no-regret move is physical build speed, low at 2. Statutory time limits on permits, one-stop approvals and pre-zoned land would speed every kind of investment and cost little to enact. The second no-regret move is geopolitical positioning, also 2. Deepening EU accession, keeping open access to capital markets and joining trusted-partner technology frameworks protects Kosovo under any scenario; contested statehood makes this urgent. A cautious government can act on both today and lose nothing if the skeptics are right. The third lever is the bet. Compute and energy access, at the lowest band of 1, barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under a fast takeoff it becomes Kosovo's biggest constraint. Closing it means adding clean generation, storage and grid links, then packaging power and land to attract investment. Rwanda offers a model to adapt: it built Kigali Innovation City by pre-zoning land and services to draw tech investment. To see how moving these scores shifts Kosovo's path under each scenario, open the atlas's [policy editor](#).

The three levers — and which pay off regardless

Compute & energy access

score 1 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 24 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 24 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet

Physical build speed

score 2 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 17 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 17 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet

Trusted chip & tech access


score 2 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 12 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 12 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.

AGI bet


The no-regret levers pay off in every scenario, so a cautious government can act on them today. The AGI bets become decisive only if takeoff is real.

GDP per person to 2060, by scenario



Linear scale; solid lines are the three scenarios, dashed grey the no-AI baseline. Growth ramps from 2027 to each scenario's rate at its AGI year (Fast ~2030, Gradual ~2045), then holds. Timing and divergence are the point, not end levels; steep paths exit the top of the capped axis.

The nine factors



Solid: Kosovo. Dashed: the median of its archetype. Scores are relative to the other 156 countries (3 ≈ global median, 5 = leading today).

Outcomes under each scenario

SCENARIO	GROWTH / YR	WORLD RANK	INDEX	DOUBLING
Modest	4.4%	39 / 157	52.1	16.1 yrs
Gradual	7.4%	91 / 157	49.1	9.7 yrs
Fast	6%	110 / 157	42.4	11.9 yrs

Post-AGI growth rate, rank among 157 countries, AGI Growth Index (0–100, scenario-weighted), and the implied economy doubling time. The Modest path is the baseline the AGI scenarios fork from.

THE THREE SCENARIOS

Modest the Acemoglu view

AI as a normal productivity tool

Intelligence was never the binding constraint on growth, so AI delivers real but ordinary gains. Each country gets a one-time boost of a couple of percent of GDP, phased in through 2035; growth then returns to trend. The mainstream-economics view.

≤0.66% TFP over a decade — a one-time gain

Kosovo: 4.4% growth a year · #39 of 157

Gradual Erdil & Besiroglu, base case

Broad automation, on a long timeline

Broad automation of remote work arrives around 2045, with gains building slowly from the late 2020s. Growth then reaches up to ~20% a year for the best-positioned countries — ten times today's frontier trend. A slow arrival gives countries time to adapt, so the gains are wide but uneven.

up to ~20%/yr after 2045 — 10× the frontier trend

Kosovo: 7.4% growth a year · #91 of 157

Fast Erdil & Besiroglu, fast takeoff


Fast takeoff — today's infrastructure decides

Transformation lands around 2030, before countries can adjust. Whoever already owns compute, capital and the ability to build wins; the gap between countries widens dramatically — and some are left growing slower than they would have without AGI.

up to ~40%/yr from 2030

Kosovo: 6% growth a year · #110 of 157

Factor scores — and where policy bites



♦ marks this country's highest-leverage policy targets: the weakest factors carrying the most weight under the AGI scenarios. The atlas's interactive policy editor (agigrowth.org/#editor) simulates how raising any score changes growth under each scenario.

Archetype: Reform climbers

Actually climbing: sustained growth from a low base, with improving institutions.

Wins: The gradual world, where two decades of adjustment time reward momentum.

Watch: The climb runs through the very labor-intensive rungs automation removes.

Dominican Republic **10.6%** · #47

Senegal **9.6%** · #60

Kyrgyzstan **9%** · #70

Rwanda **8.9%** · #72

Laos **8.2%** · #81

Georgia **8%** · #84

Côte d'Ivoire **7.6%** · #87

Djibouti **7.6%** · #88

Ghana **7.4%** · #92

Benin **7.2%** · #97

The regional picture — Rich, capable — and dependent on someone else's frontier.

Europe has the world's densest cluster of high-trust absorbers: strong institutions, high measured adoption, deep skills. What it does not have is a frontier. The entire continent hosts about 8% of tracked training compute — a tenth of the American share — and none of the leading labs. That makes Europe's position derivative in a way its wealth conceals: its access to frontier capability rests on continued alliance inclusion under the US AI umbrella (most of the continent sat in Tier 1 of the 2025 diffusion framework) and on open-weight models remaining available not far behind the frontier. Neither is guaranteed across twenty years, and the hedge — building sovereign European capability — collides with the region's domestic constraints: high energy prices, slow permitting, and workforces aging from Lisbon to Warsaw. The UK and Ireland lead on absorption; Central Europe is building real manufacturing capacity; the Balkans and Moldova trail on institutions; Ukraine remains a war economy. Given AGI, Europe's internal spread is already wide — and the gap between absorbing AI and owning any part of it is the region's defining exposure.

Method, in brief

Each country is scored 1–5 on nine factors from public data (World Bank, Epoch AI, ITU, IMF and national sources). A scenario-weighted average forms the AGI Growth Index (0–100), which maps to a post-AGI growth rate inside ceilings derived from Erdil & Besiroglu (2023): ~20% growth a year for the best-positioned country under Gradual takeoff (AGI ~2045), ~40% under Fast (AGI ~2030); growth ramps convexly from 2027. The scenario sets the growth rates on offer; the index only decides where each country sits within them. The Modest scenario is the skeptics' baseline — a small uplift on each country's own ten-year trend. These are simulations for structured thinking, not forecasts; no probabilities are attached to any scenario.

Watch the global signals live: the METR task-horizon curve at metr.org/time-horizons · frontier-lab revenue at epoch.ai/ai-companies · AI-chip spending at epoch.ai/ai-chip-sales.

Explore further: full methodology agigrowth.org/#methodology · map & rankings agigrowth.org/#explore · country profiles agigrowth.org/#countries · policy editor agigrowth.org/#editor