

Lithuania

Archetype **Stalled middle**GDP / person **\$33k**Population **2.89M**10-yr trend **3.2%**Gradual **9.3%** · #63Fast **13.5%** · #53

WHERE LITHUANIA STARTS

Lithuania enters the AGI era as a stalled middle: middling income, middling scores, and slow growth that leaves it drifting behind faster groups. At about \$33,000 per person, it is neither frontier nor fragile. Two scores stand out at the top. Cyber resilience is 4.7 out of 5 and climate resilience 4.9, among the best defended in the world. Its fintech cluster in Vilnius and its world-class scientific-laser industry show real absorptive strength; AI diffusion capacity scores 3.6. But two scores pull hard the other way. Compute and energy access is 1.1, the constraint that most defines it. Demographics and migration is 1.3, reflecting an aging, shrinking population. Ten-year trend growth is 3.2% a year. Every scenario turns on energy and people.

THE THREE PATHS

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline; the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the Modest scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Lithuania would grow 3.4% a year, a shade above trend, ranking 62nd of 157. Its fintech and manufacturing strengths would carry it, but the demographic drag would hold it back. Under the **Gradual** takeoff, growth would climb over two decades and reach 9.3% a year only around 2045, ranking 63rd. An economy growing at 9.3% doubles in under eight years. The long runway lets Lithuania turn skills and institutions into hosted AI services, if the power arrives. Under the **Fast** takeoff, growth would reach 13.5% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling every five and a half years, and its rank would rise to 53rd, up ten places. A fast world rewards the cyber and climate defenses it already holds. Regulation and politics could slow or redirect any path. How Lithuanians and their leaders respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.

HOW YOU WOULD KNOW WHICH WORLD YOU ARE IN

The scenarios look nearly identical until about 2030. Watch leading indicators, not GDP, and watch them live. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task-horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier-lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would signal a fast world. A point or two above trend by the mid-2030s would signal a gradual one. A fade back to trend would signal a modest one. Lithuania's own signals would arrive sooner

than the growth data: hyperscaler hosting commitments on Lithuanian soil, new generation and grid capacity reaching financial close, the pace of fintech licensing from the Bank of Lithuania, and the order books of its laser and life-science exporters.

IF GROWTH GOES EXPLOSIVE

Explosive is relative. At 9.3% growth a year under Gradual, Lithuania would run far ahead of its own history, yet trail its region: the European median reaches 10.4% and the frontier would compound at 19.5%. Under Fast, 13.5% would still sit below the regional median of 16.4% and far below the frontier's 39.2%. This is catch-up by Lithuania's own standards, not a break into the lead. At 13.5% the economy doubles about every five and a half years. A child starting school now would finish it in a country several times richer. Faster growth would raise labor demand and wages, which could ease the emigration that has thinned Lithuania's workforce. There is a way this leaves Lithuania worse off. It would host and rent frontier compute rather than own it, inside a chip regime whose rules are set elsewhere. Access could be repriced or cut off by decisions made abroad. The hedge is to build sovereign generation and lock in durable compute access. Even then, the pace-setter would shift to the state, testing how fast the energy regulator, planning offices and courts can permit and count.

WHAT LITHUANIA CAN DO NOW

Three levers follow from the scores, and two pay off whether or not AGI arrives. The first no-regret lever is catch-up headroom, low at 2.0. Stronger institutions, more openness to trade and foreign investment, and deeper finance and skills raise growth in the skeptic's world too. The second no-regret lever is demographics, at 1.3. Raising participation among women and older workers, attracting skilled migrants, and investing in schooling so people complement AI rather than compete with it pay off under every scenario. A cautious government can act on both today and lose nothing if the skeptics are right. The third lever is the bet: compute and energy access, at 1.1 and the heaviest-weighted factor. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under a fast takeoff it becomes Lithuania's biggest lever. Having just synchronized its grid with continental Europe, Lithuania can add generation, storage and fast permits, then package power and land to draw hyperscale investment. Thailand did this by securing multi-billion-dollar data-center commitments from Amazon and Google. Open the atlas's [policy editor](#) to see how moving these scores changes Lithuania's path under each scenario.

The three levers — and which pay off regardless

Demographics & migration

score 1.3 / 5 · weight 12 under skeptic → 6 under fast takeoff

Counts under the Modest scenario too (12→6). Closing this gap pays off whether or not AGI arrives.

No-regret

Catch-up headroom

score 2 / 5 · weight 16 under skeptic → 6 under fast takeoff

Counts under the Modest scenario too (16→6). Closing this gap pays off whether or not AGI arrives.

No-regret

Compute & energy access


score 1.1 / 5 · weight 8 under skeptic → 24 under fast takeoff

Weight climbs from 8 to 24 as takeoff nears. It barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary — the lever that needs a view on the takeoff.


AGI bet

The no-regret levers pay off in every scenario, so a cautious government can act on them today. The AGI bet becomes decisive only if takeoff is real.

GDP per person to 2060, by scenario



The nine factors



Solid: Lithuania. Dashed: the median of its archetype. Scores are relative to the other 156 countries (3 ≈ global median, 5 = leading today).

Outcomes under each scenario

SCENARIO	GROWTH / YR	WORLD RANK	INDEX	DOUBLING
Modest	3.4%	62 / 157	59.2	20.7 yrs
Gradual	9.3%	63 / 157	56.5	7.8 yrs
Fast	13.5%	53 / 157	55.7	5.5 yrs

Post-AGI growth rate, rank among 157 countries, AGI Growth Index (0–100, scenario-weighted), and the implied economy doubling time. The Modest path is the baseline the AGI scenarios fork from.

THE THREE SCENARIOS

Modest the Acemoglu view

AI as a normal productivity tool

Intelligence was never the binding constraint on growth, so AI delivers real but ordinary gains. Each country gets a one-time boost of a couple of percent of GDP, phased in through 2035; growth then returns to trend. The mainstream-economics view.

≤0.66% TFP over a decade – a one-time gain

Lithuania: 3.4% growth a year · #62 of 157

Gradual Erdil & Besiroglu, base case

Broad automation, on a long timeline

Broad automation of remote work arrives around 2045, with gains building slowly from the late 2020s. Growth then reaches up to ~20% a year for the best-positioned countries — ten times today's frontier trend. A slow arrival gives countries time to adapt, so the gains are wide but uneven.

up to ~20%/yr after 2045 – 10× the frontier trend

Lithuania: 9.3% growth a year · #63 of 157

Fast Erdil & Besiroglu, fast takeoff


Fast takeoff — today's infrastructure decides

Transformation lands around 2030, before countries can adjust. Whoever already owns compute, capital and the ability to build wins; the gap between countries widens dramatically — and some are left growing slower than they would have without AGI.

up to ~40%/yr from 2030

Lithuania: 13.5% growth a year · #53 of 157

Factor scores — and where policy bites



♦ marks this country's highest-leverage policy targets: the weakest factors carrying the most weight under the AGI scenarios. The atlas's interactive policy editor (agigrowth.org/#editor) simulates how raising any score changes growth under each scenario.

Archetype: Stalled middle

Neither frontier nor fragile: middling income, middling scores, slow growth — at every size, from micro-states to Brazil.

Wins: No clean window — gains arrive imported, and late.

Watch: Drift: the gap to every faster group compounds year by year.

Jordan 11.8% · #37

Brazil 11% · #43

Mexico 10.4% · #48

Ecuador 10% · #54

Thailand 10% · #55

Slovakia 9.6% · #59

Argentina 9.5% · #61

Cabo Verde 9.3% · #64

Croatia 9.1% · #67

Nepal 9.1% · #68

The regional picture — Rich, capable — and dependent on someone else's frontier.

Europe has the world's densest cluster of high-trust absorbers: strong institutions, high measured adoption, deep skills. What it does not have is a frontier. The entire continent hosts about 8% of tracked training compute — a tenth of the American share — and none of the leading labs. That makes Europe's position derivative in a way its wealth conceals: its access to frontier capability rests on continued alliance inclusion under the US AI umbrella (most of the continent sat in Tier 1 of the 2025 diffusion framework) and on open-weight models remaining available not far behind the frontier. Neither is guaranteed across twenty years, and the hedge — building sovereign European capability — collides with the region's domestic constraints: high energy prices, slow permitting, and workforces aging from Lisbon to Warsaw. The UK and Ireland lead on absorption; Central Europe is building real manufacturing capacity; the Balkans and Moldova trail on institutions; Ukraine remains a war economy. Given AGI, Europe's internal spread is already wide — and the gap between absorbing AI and owning any part of it is the region's defining exposure.

Method, in brief

Each country is scored 1–5 on nine factors from public data (World Bank, Epoch AI, ITU, IMF and national sources). A scenario-weighted average forms the AGI Growth Index (0–100), which maps to a post-AGI growth rate inside ceilings derived from Erdil & Besiroglu (2023): ~20% growth a year for the best-positioned country under Gradual takeoff (AGI ~2045), ~40% under Fast (AGI ~2030); growth ramps convexly from 2027. The scenario sets the growth rates on offer; the index only decides where each country sits within them. The Modest scenario is the skeptics' baseline — a small uplift on each country's own ten-year trend. These are simulations for structured thinking, not forecasts; no probabilities are attached to any scenario.

Watch the global signals live: the METR task-horizon curve at metr.org/time-horizons · frontier-lab revenue at epoch.ai/ai-companies · AI-chip spending at epoch.ai/ai-chip-sales.

Explore further: full methodology agigrowth.org/#methodology · map & rankings agigrowth.org/#explore · country profiles agigrowth.org/#countries · policy editor agigrowth.org/#editor