Lens
Gradual: Broad automation and transformative growth · AGI ~2040
Growth as of

Algeria

MENA · Resource suppliers
$6,051
GDP per capita · 2025 · World Bank
AGI Growth Index
51.6
Post-AGI rate · from 2040 · Gradual
5.5%
vs trend +3.3pp · doubles every 12.9y
Growth in 2035 · Gradual
3.2%
vs trend +1pp
Trend, no AI
2.2%
mean 2016–2025
GDP in 2045 vs no-AI path
×1.34
levels, not rates · think in levels first (Moll & Imas 2026)
Average growth 2025–2045
3.7%
ramp included · comparable across scenarios

GDP per capita to 2060, by scenario

0$20k$40k20252030203520402045205020552060Fast AGIGradual AGI
ModestGradualFastdashed = no AI

Constant-rate scenario path; the 2060 endpoint levels are illustrative, not forecasts.

Factor profile

ComputeGeopoliticsDiffusionLanguageBuildCatch-upDemographicsCyberClimate
Algeria
Resource suppliers

These economies supply copper, fuels, bauxite, iron ore, uranium and other inputs required for the build-out.

Modeled advantage: The physical build-out creates terms-of-trade gains, including under Fast.
Main exposure: Commodity income produces lasting development only if rents are converted into other productive assets.
Compute & Energy Access1.0
Geopolitical Positioning2.0
AI Diffusion Capacity3.0
Language Inclusion3.0
Physical Build Speed4.9
Catch-up Headroom3.2
Demographics & Migration2.5
Cyber Resilience2.1
Climate & Environmental Resilience1.3

How this economy meets AI

Today’s production, workforce and automation baseline — context for the scenarios, outside the AGI Growth Index.

Production baseResource-led
Workforce structureIndustrial workforce
Work organizationUnavailable
Current automationMedium current exposure

Where output comes from (% of GDP)

Agriculture 202514.5%
Industry 202534.8%
Services 202545.7%

Where people work (% of employment)

Agriculture 20259.5%
Industry 202532.3%
Services 202558.3%

Informal employment

Share of employmentComparable data are not available for this measure.

Current automation exposure

Tasks exposed43.3%
Interpretation of these indicators

Production and exports are resource-led. Direct workplace exposure may be limited, while global demand, commodity prices, extraction productivity and ownership of the resulting capital still transmit AI’s effects.

Current automation, not AGI. The Global Automation Atlas measures economically plausible automation in typical workplaces around 2026. It is a useful baseline for where automation can enter today, not a forecast of exposure to gradual or fast AGI. Explore current task exposure in the Global Automation Atlas →

Sources: World Bank WDI; ILOSTAT; Global Automation Atlas (Garg, Crosta & Baier, 2026). The latest available year is shown for each measure; vintages differ, so shares may not sum to 100.

Country brief · simulations, not forecastsDownload the earlier brief (PDF)
This brief is being updated. It was drafted before the atlas’s latest model update, so some of its growth rates, ranks and dates differ from the figures above. Where they differ, the figures above are current.

Where Algeria starts

Algeria enters the AGI era as a resource supplier — a country that sells the build-out its raw inputs. Its input is energy. Fuels make up 96% of exports, almost all of it oil and gas piped to Europe through Medgaz and Transmed or shipped as LNG by Sonatrach. Physical build speed scores 4.9 out of 5, near the top of the world: the East-West Highway, the vast Djamaa el Djazair mosque and decades of state housing show a country that can move earth and pour concrete at scale. What is missing is digital. Compute access scores 1 — Algeria has almost no data center capacity. Climate resilience is 1.3, with Saharan heat and scarce water. At about $6,051 per person it is lower-middle-income, and ten-year trend growth is 2.1% a year.

The three paths

These are simulations, not forecasts. The Modest path is the baseline; the two AGI scenarios fork from it. Under the Modest scenario, AI stays a normal technology. Algeria would gain almost nothing on trend: 2.2% growth a year, 111th of 157. Its gas would keep flowing to Europe much as today. Under Gradual takeoff, growth would build over two decades and reach 6.1% a year once AGI matures around 2045, lifting Algeria to 108th. At that pace the economy doubles in under twelve years. The extra demand would come from a world building power and compute, which needs the fuel and electricity Algeria sells. Under Fast takeoff, growth would reach 8.6% a year from the early 2030s, a doubling roughly every eight years, and Algeria would climb 27 places to 81st — its sharpest gain of any scenario. A fast build-out rewards energy suppliers, and that is Algeria's one clear edge. Regulation and politics could slow or redirect any of these paths. How Algerians and their government respond to transformative AI is a variable the model holds constant.

How you would know which world you are in

The three scenarios look almost identical until about 2030. So watch leading indicators, not GDP, and check them live rather than trust any snapshot. Three global signals matter most. First, whether the METR task horizon curve keeps doubling every four to five months through 2027–28; METR publishes it at metr.org. Second, whether frontier lab revenue and capital spending keep compounding; Epoch AI tracks both at epoch.ai. Third, whether growth in the ten to twenty most-ready economies — the United States and China above all — breaks above trend in the early 2030s. Double-digit growth there within a couple of years of 2030 would point to a fast world; a point or two above trend by the mid-2030s to a gradual one; a fade back to trend to a modest one. Algeria's own signals would arrive sooner than the GDP figures: rising gas export volumes and prices to Europe, Sonatrach's order books, progress on the Solar 1000 programme, and any hyperscaler commitment to host compute on Algerian soil.

If growth goes explosive

Explosive is relative. At 8.6% growth a year under the Fast scenario, Algeria would still trail the frontier badly — the United States would be compounding at nearly 39% — and it would sit below the MENA median of 16.1%. But it would run four times faster than its own recent history. The economy would double roughly every eight years, so a child born today would finish school in a country twice as rich. Gas and power exports to a building world could swell the budget, and rising wages at home could ease the pressure on young Algerians to emigrate for work. There is a way this leaves Algeria worse off, and it is worth naming. A commodity boom is not a development strategy. If the energy rents are spent rather than converted into industry and skills, they evaporate when demand shifts, and the compute Algeria hosts would be rented from abroad, not owned. The hedge is to turn the windfall into owned capability while it lasts. Even a boom would test the state: Sonatrach, Sonelgaz, the energy ministry and the fuel-subsidy system would have to permit, invest and diversify faster than they ever have.

What Algeria can do now

Three levers follow from the scores, and two pay off whether or not AGI arrives. The first is AI diffusion, at 3, which carries real weight even in the skeptic's world. Digital skills, permissive rules for deploying AI and digitized government services would raise productivity under every scenario, so this is a no-regret move. The second is geopolitical positioning, at 2. Avoiding sanctions exposure, keeping access to capital markets and negotiating trusted-partner terms for technology pay off regardless of takeoff speed — another no-regret step. The third lever is the bet. Compute and energy access, at 1, barely moves growth if AI stays ordinary, but under a fast takeoff it becomes Algeria's single biggest lever, weighted most heavily of the three. Closing it means packaging Saharan power, land and fast permits to attract data center investment. Algeria can adapt a working model from a fellow resource supplier: Chile launched a national data center plan in 2024, using cool climate and clean power to court hyperscalers. A cautious government can act on the two no-regret levers today at no loss. Open the atlas's policy editor to see how moving these scores reshapes Algeria's path under each scenario.

Use the policy editor to test how different factor scores change Algeria’s modeled path. The roadmap builder below can then incorporate those targets into a 1,000-day planning prompt.

Drafted with Claude, Anthropic’s AI model, from the atlas’s data and an editorial template set by the author.

For government planning · compatible with any AI model

Create a 1000-day AGI and growth roadmap prompt

This prompt can be used with Claude, ChatGPT or an open-weight model hosted on your institution’s systems. It includes the atlas material for Algeria: the country brief, economic structure, region, archetype and global scenarios. It instructs the model to ask for local information, use existing strategies and the political calendar, and preserve the atlas’s interpretation rules. The prompt is assembled in your browser; the information entered here is not sent elsewhere.

1 · Read the brief  →  2 · Set targets in the policy editor →  3 · Generate and copy the prompt  →  4 · Run it with an approved model, with high reasoning effort and web access where permitted

No score targets included. Set them in the policy editor.

Instructions are generated in the selected language; the data annex remains in English. Translations are machine-drafted, and corrections from native speakers are welcome through the contact links on the start page.